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On the face of it, the deal is a three-way win-win situation. Upon closer examination, though, the benefits that could accompany such a deal seem far less certain and the risks associated with them rather considerable.
Deterrence clearly failed in Ukraine. In the run-up to Russia’s invasion in February 2022, America and its NATO allies took steps to warn Russia of dire consequences, including deep sanctions and political excommunication. None of that mattered to Vladimir Putin.
Rising nuclear dangers demand the recruitment of new and diverse voices to the nuclear policy field. This one-day, interactive event for interns, students, and young professionals will provide opportunities for networking, mentorship, and substantive nuclear policy discussions with guest speakers.
Climate change is very unlikely to undermine the complex web of facilities, bases, and operations involved in nuclear programs and their deterrence missions. But even small incidents and accidents are potentially devastating.
Most nuclear states are undertaking modernization campaigns to ensure their nuclear weapons are viable for decades to come. While aimed to address a changing geostrategic environment, do these plans account for a changing geophysical environment? Are nuclear weapons vulnerable to climate change?
Climate change stands to impact each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad in different and increasingly serious ways. Given the high-stakes nature of the nuclear enterprise, the Department of Defense and other key stakeholders must better prepare for, mitigate, and adapt to these climate challenges.
Although the geopolitical rationale for the arrangement is understandable, the parties have failed to come to terms with its core problems.
The concept of strategic stability has come under immense pressure in recent years. Nuclear multipolarity, novel technologies, an exacerbating crisis in arms control, and a growing acceptance of “softer” norms are all taking a toll.
The resulting framework may look very different from arms control of the past. But it would be better than a future in which proliferation proceeds in the absence of any shared guardrails for handling the most dangerous weapons in the world.
Canberra should push to alleviate itself of the burden of managing spent fuel while enhancing commitments to nonproliferation.