It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Kremlin to sweep unwelcome developments under the carpet. The war has begun to change Russia, and profound internal shifts are likely underway—in Putin’s regime, in the elites’ perception of Putin, and in the public’s attitude toward the war.
The aspiration of former Ukrainian politicians working in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine to be treated as equals by the Kremlin has not been realized, and the unpredictability of the ongoing war makes them increasingly vulnerable.
This model of a hybrid totalitarian state and semi-mobilized society appears to be entirely acceptable to the average Russian. Certainly it’s possible to adapt to this model, including economically: a gradual decline in people’s living standards has been the norm ever since the economy started stagnating back in 2014.
Imagining history as a civilizational competition is convenient for the current Russian leadership because it means they can perceive themselves as part of a young civilization and, as such, they don’t need to calculate risks, invest in the economy, or conduct a reasonable foreign policy. Youth is forgiven everything, and Russia will inevitably, therefore, be a world leader.
It is in both countries’ interests to cooperate, since each can provide the other with something in short supply: Russia needs artillery shells for its war, while North Korea needs humanitarian aid.
Trade volumes between Russia and African nations have fallen since the last event in 2019, while the war in Ukraine and Wagner’s activities on the continent have strained political ties.
New mobilisation law is part of a wider effort to maximise Russia’s firepower and blunt western support for Kyiv.
When the war ends, Russia will face at its borders two militarily committed, capable neighbors facing a common enemy. Poland and Ukraine are bound together more strongly than at any other time in history.
The person who suffered most of all from Prigozhin’s uprising was Putin. However confident the Russian president may feel in the aftermath, he messed up. He created a monster that escaped from his control and spooked the elites.
The war in Ukraine is challenging the military’s established role in Russian domestic affairs, politicizing the armed forces, and reducing their privileged autonomy in waging war and developing the defense sector.
One of the main problems for Russia is that foreign-made equipment was used to produce microchips. This is a vulnerability that Western sanctions have targeted.
Alexandra Prokopenko focuses on the Kremlin’s decision to seize the Russian assets of two major foreign companies and what it means for the business climate and the other Western businesses who cannot — or will not — leave Russia. She also looks at Friday’s interest rate hike and new Western sanctions on Russia.
As the war in Ukraine grinds on, the notoriously troubled relationship between Georgia and Russia has, to the surprise of many, entered a new period of increased stability.
Podcast host Alex Gabuev is joined by Sophia Besch, a fellow at the Carnegie Europe Program, and Eric Ciaramella, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia and Eurasia Program, to discuss the outcomes of the NATO summit in Vilnius.
The recent public discussion in Russia on using nuclear weapons against the West was really a discussion about how Moscow can extricate itself from the difficult situation in which it finds itself—and what price it is willing to pay for a victory.
Moscow has failed to turn the grain deal to its advantage, but Türkiye has plenty of leverage to convince Russia to return to its implementation.
By imagining an attack or even an invasion, Lukashenko is increasing the risks of war coming to Belarus.
As the Turkish president shifts his focus toward Kyiv, he is essentially testing Moscow’s new red lines. How firmly is Russia prepared to react in a situation where it is simultaneously fending off a Ukrainian counteroffensive and recovering from the Wagner mutiny?
In Russia, last year’s exodus of Western companies and Russian entrepreneurs is creating opportunities to entrench the regime, as a wartime redistribution of assets belonging to those who left the country promises to enrich what remains of the middle class and bind it to the state.
Beijing has nothing to offer Moscow in terms of ideology, but will gladly share its ideas for the economy and political control.